Taiwan’s Diplomatic Setback: How Much Longer Will Eswatini Maintain Diplomatic Ties with Taiwan?

Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland, is the last African country maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Given China’s growing economic influence in Africa, why does Eswatini persist in its alliance with Taiwan?

The Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan, was established in 1949 after nationalist forces retreated to the island following their defeat in the Chinese Civil War. Despite losing control of mainland China, the ROC retained its seat in the United Nations (UN), including a position on the Security Council, with strong support from the United States.

However, a pivotal moment occurred on 25 October 1971, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, recognising the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China. This resolution expelled the ROC from the UN and its associated bodies. African nations played a significant role in this shift, with 26 out of 39 voting in favor of the PRC’s restoration. Eswatini was one of the 13 African countries (the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, South Africa, and Swaziland) that opposed this move.

China has since blocked Taiwan’s participation in international affairs and reiterated its strong position on the “One China” principle. Despite the PRC’s efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, 12 countries, including Eswatini, still recognise Taiwan. This represents a mere 6.2 percent of UN member states. The PRC’s “dollar diplomacy,” a term used by Taiwan to describe China’s financial incentives to sway countries’ allegiances, has significantly reduced Taiwan’s allies. In 2016, Taiwan had 22 diplomatic allies, but this number has since halved, with recent defections including Honduras in March 2023, and Nauru in January this year.

In Africa, only Eswatini remains aligned with Taiwan. Other African countries have switched to Beijing, attracted by China’s economic initiatives such as the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Between 2003 and 2018, Liberia, Senegal, Chad, Malawi, Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Burkina Faso all shifted their allegiance from Taipei to Beijing. Despite the diplomatic dilemma that Taiwan faces, it has informal links with countries through what it calls trade offices. Overall, Taipei operates some 110 overseas posts worldwide. In Africa, three posts exist: in Somaliland, Nigeria, and South Africa.

Eswatini’s Relationship with Taiwan: Costs and Benefits

Eswatini has maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan since its independence in 1968. This relationship involves significant economic cooperation. For instance, in 2020, Eswatini was Taiwan’s 25th trade partner in Africa, with a trade value of US$12.7 million, and the two nations enjoy duty-free market access for over 100 product lines under the Eswatini–Republic of China (Taiwan)–Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA).

Taiwan’s assistance to Eswatini spans various sectors, including rural electrification, healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Some of the big projects include the renovation of the Mbabane Government Hospital and the construction of the King Mswati III International Airport. Additionally, Taiwan has provided scholarships to several Swazi students and financial aid, such as the US$22.9 million reconstruction fund following protests in 2021. In 2023, the Kingdom of Eswatini owed the Taiwanese government some US$1.4 billion.

Despite these benefits, Eswatini faces significant pressure from Beijing. In 2020, China threatened to cut off economic ties and impose diplomatic isolation if Eswatini did not switch its recognition to the PRC. In March 2024, China’s Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Lin Jian slammed Eswatini’s prime minister for visiting Taiwan, saying it was a violation of the One-China policy. Indeed, Beijing is vigilant about foreign government officials visiting Taiwan. In 2022, the House Speaker of the US Congress visited the Island, prompting Beijing to conduct a series of military exercises around Taiwan.

It should be noted that despite Eswatini’s relations with Taiwan, the Kingdom continues to engage well with Beijing in trade. In 2022, for example, Eswatini imported US$109 million worth of goods from China but only exported US$4.3 million in return. However, due to Eswatini’s significant economic dependence on South Africa, its largest trading partner, the potential impacts of Chinese economic “punishments” could be mitigated. In 2022, about 65 percent of Eswatini’s exports and 75 percent of its imports were with South Africa. Therefore, any effective Chinese economic penalties would necessitate the cooperation of South Africa, a crucial ally of Beijing within the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) bloc, which has now expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates, also known as BRICS+.

Additionally, coordination through FOCAC, G20, and other international forums, from which Eswatini is excluded, would be essential. In the 2018 FOCAC Summit, for instance, China  pledged another US$60 billion worth of investment to the continent and 50,000 scholarships to African students through 2021, benefits from which Eswatini was excluded. Between 2000 and 2022, African governments and regional organisations received over US$170 billion in loans from the PRC, primarily through the BRI. China, being a member of the UN Security Council and other major international agencies, has continued to block Taiwan’s participation in such bodies. Consequently, Eswatini’s participation in these forums or efforts to campaign for Taiwan are unlikely to succeed.

Eswatini might consider its small population and relatively low debt level compared to other African countries, including its heavily indebted neighbor South Africa, as significant factors in its diplomatic decisions. In this regard, Eswatini has avoided the Chinese “debt trap” that has ensnared other African nations. Moreover, with China cutting back on loans to Africa and becoming less generous, Eswatini has little to lose from this shift.

Despite an estimated GDP per capita of US$3,823 in 2023, over half of Eswatini’s population still lives in poverty. However, compared to other African nations, Eswatini’s poverty index is relatively moderate. In a ranking of 190 countries compiled by Global Finance, Eswatini placed 76th, just behind South Africa at 85th, and well ahead of over 40 other African countries.

Finally, Eswatini is not only Taiwan’s last ally in Africa but also the continent’s only surviving absolute monarchy, ruled by the House of Dlamini. In 1986, King Mswati III succeeded his father, King Sobhuza II, who died at the age of 82. King Mswati III is unlikely to relinquish power and continues to rule by decree. This form of governance makes it challenging to influence domestic opinion, as demonstrated by the 2021 protests that resulted in the deaths of around 46 pro-democracy protesters. For Taiwan, which practices democracy, there is a risk that its financial support could end up in the hands of the King, who has a history of clamping down on pro-democracy protests. Nevertheless, as long as Taiwan is willing to accept this, Eswatini will likely remain aligned with Taiwan for as long as King Mswati III desires or until his reign ends.

Overall, the sustainability of Eswatini’s alliance with Taiwan is uncertain given the significant economic and political leverage China holds over African nations. Eswatini’s strategic dependence on South Africa and its ability to avoid the Chinese “debt trap” have provided some insulation from Beijing’s economic reprisals. Yet, the authoritarian nature of King Mswati III’s rule poses ethical and practical challenges for Taiwan, a self-governed democracy. As China continues to expand its influence through initiatives like the BRI and the FOCAC, the resilience of Eswatini’s diplomatic stance will be tested. The kingdom’s future alignment will likely depend on its ability to navigate these geopolitical currents while balancing the benefits and risks associated with its longstanding partnership with Taiwan.

Joel Odota is a final-year Master of Politics and International Relations student at The Australian National University. His research interests focus on China-Africa relations, the geopolitical competition between China and the United States, and the agency of African nations in global politics.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.